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A PUZZLE EVEN THE CODEBREAKERS HAVE
TROUBLE SOLVING: A CLASH OF
INTERESTS OVER THE ELECTRONIC
ENCRYPTION STANDARD
SEAN M. FLYNN*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 9, 1994, when the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) announced the federal Escrowed Encryption Stan-
dard (EES),' the simmering debate over encryption policy in the United
States boiled over. Public interest groups argued that the standard
would jeopardize an individual's right to privacy. U.S. multinationals
voiced concerns that the government would undercut private encryption
technology and limit their choice of encryption products for sensitive
transmissions. Computer software groups claimed that EES lacked
commercial appeal and would adversely affect their ability to compete.
Pitted against these concerns were those of the law enforcement and
national security communities, which countered that the interests of
national security required the adoption of EES.
A quick study2 of EES reveals little that would explain this uproar.
The NIST issued EES as an encryption methodology for use in its
government information processing3 pursuant to the Computer Secu-
rity Act of 1987. 4 The EES is intended to supersede the existing
government standard, Data Encryption Standard (DES), which has been
in use since 1977 and is very popular.5 The new standard's methodology
is classified, but the government has stated that it represents the state
of the art in security protection. The catch in this positive scenario is
that the government keeps a backdoor key that will allow it to decrypt
encrypted messages.
So why did an obscure and seemingly insignificant announcement
cause so much commotion? Upon closer examination, one discovers that
* B.A., Duke University, 1990;J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, anticipated 1996.
1. Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 185, Escrowed Encryp-
tion Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997 (1994) [hereinafter Approval of EES].
2. The specifics of the EES are examined in greater detail in Part II.C.
3. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 5998.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(a)(5) (1994).
5. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK
ENVIRONMENTS 121-22 (1994).
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
encryption, though still obscure to many, is a hot commodity in the
information age. It is the silver shield that protects personal, financial,
trade, and national security information. And, until recently, the govern-
ment has enjoyed a monopoly over its development and use. Viewed
from this perspective, the NIST announcement was seen by many as a
government attempt to maintain its monopoly to the detriment of
potential users and private developers.
The ensuing clash of interests has created an impasse. Encryption
users and privacy advocates refuse to accept the government's EES
standard. For its part, the government maintains stringent export
controls to undermine the development of feasible alternative standards
and to deny software producers economies of scale.
This Note will undertake a number of examinations. First, it will
review the government's role in cryptography. Second, it will study EES
in detail. Third, it will explore how the EES scheme works with other
aspects of the government's encryption policies to trigger legal, eco-
nomic, and political concerns. Fourth, it will survey the alternatives to
EES. Finally, it will suggest how the interests in the current policy
debate may achieve an accommodation that would sufficiently address
privacy and competitiveness concerns, on the one hand, while meeting
national security and law enforcement concerns on the other.
II. A QUICK CRYPTOGRAPHY PRIMER
A. Wat is C0yptography?
Before proceeding further into this complex area, it may be useful to
go over some fundamentals. At its base, cryptography is the practice of
transforming a message into gibberish (encryption), transmitting it,
and transforming it back into "plaintext" (decryption) at the other
end.6 Though once the province of spies, diplomats, and generals
as a device to protect sensitive communications, encryption has
moved gradually into the mainstream. With the increasing prevalence
of networked computing7 and its increasing vulnerability to tamper-
6. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 1-2 (1994).
7. Andrew Johnson Laird, President of Johnson-Laird, Inc., estimated that there are more
than 3.2 million "host" computers on the Internet as of July 1994, an increase of 81% from the
previous year. AndrewJohnson Laird, Exploring Cyberspace: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, in
8th Ann. Advanced Computer L. Inst. 390 (Mar. 23-24, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, reproduced
by Continuing Legal Education Division of Georgetown University Law Center) (on file with Law
andPolicy in International Business). Estimates of the number of Internet users range from 2 million to
25 million. Id. at 391. If electronic money were to become legal tender on the Internet, it would
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ing," cryptography has become a valued tool both for businesses and
consumers in the protection of proprietary and personal information.
Properly employed, cryptography can perform three distinct func-
tions: (1) authenticate the sender by means of a unique "signature"; (2)
protect the confidentiality of the message during transmission and in
storage; and (3) assure the integrity of the message through encrypting
a digest.9 In general, the method by which the message is transformed
into and out of gibberish is the "algorithm." Each particular encryption
is achieved by plugging a string of numbers, or a "key," into the
algorithm and then applying the result to the message. Decryption
works by running the encrypted message back through the algorithm-
key combination.' The strength of a cryptographic system is gauged by
the length of its key and the complexity of its algorithm. '
Traditionally, cryptographic schemes used a single key; the sender
encrypted and the receiver decrypted the message with the same key.'
2
This system has an inherent weakness: the key must necessarily be
distributed to all communicants; the more widely distributed the key,
the more likely the possibility that it could fall into the wrong hands. In
response to this problem, two researchers at Stanford University created
a two-key scheme called "public key."' 13 In a public key system, one key,
which is posted publicly, encrypts the message; the second key, which is
kept secret, decrypts it. Although the keys are mathematically related,
each functions in only one direction and, thus, both are needed to
complete the encryption-decryption chain of events. 14 Since public key
algorithms are cumbersome to calculate, it would be inconvenient to use
them for the entire message. In practice, parties use public key schemes
produce a "virtual economy" as large as that of the Netherlands. Electronic Money: So Much for the
Cashless Society, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1994, at 21, 22.
8. Illicit and widespread activities on the Internet include copyright and trademark infringe-
ment, theft of trade secrets, software pirating, harassment, and unauthorized entry onto systems by
hackers. Laird, supra note 7, at 411-20.
9. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 39.
10. SCHNEIER, SUpra note 6, at 1-2.
11. Id. at 129.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Whitfield Diffie, a mathematician and computer scientist, and Martin E. Hellman, a
professor of electrical engineering, created the public key scheme at Stanford University and
published their findings in 1976. Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, N.Y. TIMES,June 12,
1994, Sec. 6, at 47-48. Shortly after the researchers published their findings, three mathematicians
at M.I.T.-Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman-implemented a public key
system of encryption, which became known by their initials, RSA. Id. at 48.
14. SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 29-30.
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to exchange a session key and a single-key algorithm. 15 Thus, public key
facilitates on the spot creation and secure distribution of the unique
session key.
B. The Federal Government's Preeminent Role in Cryptography
It is a testament to both the importance and complexity of cryptogra-
phy that the National Security Agency (NSA), 16 a part of the Depart-
ment of Defense, has until recently been the sole source of advanced
cryptographic know-how in the United States.17 The NSA has two
national missions: to collect foreign signals intelligence and to provide
secure information systems to protect classified and unclassified govern-
ment information and communication. 8 Thus, the government is not
only a developer of cryptography technology, it is a user and a regulator
of encryption products as well. These multiple roles give the government
varying levels of insight into cryptography in the United States. In its
roles as regulator and user, the government is able to monitor the
current state of encryption technology. In its roles as developer and
federal standard-setter, the government is able to influence the develop-
ment of cryptography in this country.' 9 If all of these functions were
properly coordinated, the potential would exist for the government to
impose its own standards on the marketplace while discouraging other
standards.2 0 This potential is one of the reasons that government
processing standards are not mandated for government agencies.
2 1
15. Id. at 30-31.
16. The NSA was created by a presidential memorandum on October 24, 1952 to monitor and
decode transmissions considered relevant to national security. This memorandum and the agency's
mission have been cloaked in official secrecy for more than 40 years.John Perry Barlow, Decrypting
the Puzzle Palace, 7 COMMUN. OF ACM 25, 25 (1992).
17. JAmES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 344 (1982). Although administered by the Depart-
ment of Defense, the NSA is responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence, who sets objectives,
needs, and priorities for the intelligence community. NAT7ONAL SECURrrY AGENCY, BROCHURE (on
file with Law and Policy in International Business).
18. Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). Under the Executive Order, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence within the United States, while the Central Intelligence Agency has this
responsibility abroad. Id.
19. It is because of the potency of the three complementary roles of government that the
NSA's part in developing the EES scheme is so controversial.
20. This assumes that there is a commercial need for the type of government standard
established. As I will explain later, key escrow must have a commercial appeal to succeed.
21. Hearing on Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security Before the Subcomm. on
Technology, Environment and Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d.
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Otherwise, the government might set the new standard through its
immense purchasing power.
1. Setting Federal Standards
The Brooks Act authorizes the Department of Commerce to research
and recommend data processing standards for the federal govern-
merit.2 2 Pursuant to this authority, the Department of Commerce
issued the government's first encryption standard, the Data Encryption
Standard, for use in protecting unclassified computer data and commu-
nications.
23
Although the DES algorithm was developed by IBM, it had been
submitted to the NSA for approval.24 After reviewing the algorithm, the
agency recommended certain modifications. Once IBM complied with
these recommendations,25 the standard was approved by the Depart-
ment of Commerce in 1977.26 Thus, the NSA's hand was visible in the
process of standard setting from the beginning. Critics charged that the
NSA was purposefully weakening encryption that was to be made
available to the public. 27 This provided a basis for future suspicions
concerning the NSA's role in the development of encryption.
The DES was quickly adopted by industry both in the United States
and abroad. 28 Today, there are at least 267 products available in the
Sess. 12 (1994) [hereinafter House Clipper Hearing] (statement ofJames K. Kallstrom, Special Agent
in Charge, New York Field Div., Federal Bureau of Investigation).
22. 40 U.S.C. § 759(d) (1988).
23. NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL INFO. PROCESSING
STANDARD PUBLICATION No. 46, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (Jan. 15, 1977) (on file with Law and
Policy in International Business) [hereinafter FIPS PUB. No. 46].
24. Strong versions of encryption are barred from export by the United States Munitions List,
which is administered by the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls. SCHNEIER,
supra note 6, at 449. However, since the Office of Trade Controls defers to the NSA on matters of
cryptography, developers of encryption products send their products to the NSA for review. Id. at
452.
25. BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 347.
26. FIPS PUB. No. 46, supra note 23.
27. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigated the allegation that the NSA
watered down DES and concluded that the agency "did not tamper with the design of the algorithm
in any way. IBM invented it ... and concurred that the agreed upon key size was more than
adequate for all commercial applications for which the DES was intended." SENATE SELECT COMM.
ON INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY: INVOLVEMENT OF THE NSA IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD 4 (Comm. Print 1978).
28. The DES algorithm has become the standard for electronic transfers in the banking and
financial communities. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 121.
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United States that employ DES and some 164 products that employ DES
spread across 25 countries. 29 However, the standard is now more than
twenty years old. Though it has been re-approved every five years since
its introduction, the NIST stated it will consider replacing DES in its
1998 review.
30
The Computer Security Act of 1987 called for a new federal encryp-
tion standard and laid the principal responsibility for developing future
encryption standards on the NIST.3 ' However, a Memorandum of
Understanding between the NSA and the NIST effectively undermined
the Computer Security Act's division of responsibilities such that NIST
agreed to rely on the NSA to generate the new encryption technology.
32
Thus, in 1991 when AT&T informed the NSA that it was developing a
voice-encryption product with DES technology, 33 the agency already was
working on a sophisticated encryption algorithm with a backdoor key as
a successor to DES.
This scheme became the Escrowed Encryption Standard, and its
hardware version for voice communication was dubbed the Clipper
chip.34 Since Clipper is the result of the NIST standard-setting process,
it is unsurprising that the agency considered the interests and concerns
of other government agencies when developing the scheme. 35 The
Clipper chip was designed both to incorporate the strengths of the latest
NSA algorithm3 6 and to provide authorized law enforcement officials
29. Trusted Information Systems & Software Publishers Association, Encryption Products
Database Statistics (Dec. 1994) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business) [hereinafter
Encryption Products Statistics].
30. Revision of Federal Information Processing Standard 46-1, Data Encryption Standard, 58
Fed. Reg. 69,347 (1993).
31. The NIST is authorized to develop standards for computer security and privacy, 15 U.S.C.
§ 278g-3(a) (1994); with the assistance of the National Security Agency, § 278g-3(c); and to
implement those standards, § 278g-3(b).
32. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency concerning the
Implementation of Public Law 100-235 2 (Mar. 24, 1989). The MOU provides that the NIST will
request NSA assistance on all cryptographic matters, including research, development, evaluation,
and endorsement. In addition, a working group composed of members from each agency must
review all cryptographic matters prior to public disclosure. Id. at 3.
33. Michael L. Rozansky, Taking a Byte Out of Crime, Hous. CHRON.,July 31, 1994, at 2F.
34. The hardware version of EES for data communication is called "Capstone." OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 65.
35. See House Clipper Hearing, supra note 21, at 40 (Statement by Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy
Director, NIST).
36. Skipjack, the latest algorithm, is contended to be "16 million times tougher to crack than
the previously endorsed system." Rozansky, supra note 33, at 2F.
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with a backdoor key to decrypt messages.
3 7
Pointing out the disadvantages of DES and dangling the prospect of
export approval for products utilizing Clipper,3 8 the NSA suggested that
AT&T incorporate the yet-to-be-announced Clipper chip into its prod-
uct. For AT&T, this was a chance to use next generation technology in
its product and to win early export approval. After all, the DES was a
single-key system with all the inherent key management shortcomings,
and it was well over twenty years old. For the NSA, this was an
opportunity to commercialize a standard that would give the govern-
ment access to encrypted messages. Although the agency was still years
ahead of the state of the art technology publicly available,3 9 the number
of strong encryption products available in the United States had ex-
ploded. Thus, in April 1993, AT&T was persuaded by the government to
use the Clipper chip in its Surity 3600, a mass-market voice scrambling
box.4 °
'Since the Clipper chip and EES are voluntary technology,4' the
government must rely on widespread acceptance for the scheme to be
effective. To this end, federal officials pointed mainly to the security
provided by EES.4 2 As one Department ofJustice official declared, "We
are confident... of the quality and strength of key-escrow encryption as
embodied in this chip, and we believe it will become increasingly
attractive to the private sector as an excellent, easy-to-use method of
protecting sensitive personal and business information. 4 3 Nonetheless,
37. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 5998. The Clipper chip and EES utilize the classified
Skipjack encryption/decryption algorithm. For Clipper, the algorithm arid the protected backdoor
gateway are placed on a computer chip that is designed to prevent modification or reverse
engineering. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 65.
38. U.S. Sets New Licensing Procedures for Enciyption-Capable Exports, II Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
212-13 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter New Licensing Procedures].
39. The NSA employs more mathematicians than any other employer and purchases more
computer hardware than any other buyer. SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 439.
40. Rozansky,supra note 33, at 2F. However, impatient with the government's progress, AT&T
introduced an earlier version of their Surity 3600 that made use of a third-party proprietary
encryption algorithm. Brad Brass,AT&T Unveils First ClipperDevice on GSA Schedule, FED. COMPUTER
WK., May 9, 1994, at 24, 29.
41. Id.
42. "[W]e sought to develop a technology which provides very strong protection for govern-
ment information requiring confidentiality protection." House Clipper Hearing, supra note 21, at 42
(statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Director, NIST).
43. Statement ofjo Ann Harris, Asst. Attorney General, Criminal Division of the Department
ofJustice, Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the Comm. on thejudiciary of the
United States Senate, May 3, 1994, at 3 (concerning Key Escrow Encryption Program) (on file with
Law and Policy in International Business).
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the only significant purchase of products using the scheme has been an
order of nine thousand phones by the Department ofJustice. 44 Although
many explanations may exist for the commercial failure of the Surity
3600, it is reasonable to conclude that the private sector is reluctant to
embrace the EES.
2. Government Purchases
The government created the market for encryption with the develop-
ment of DES;4 5 despite the explosion in telecommunications and the
increasing demand for privacy protection, the U.S. government remains
the largest purchaser of telecommunication products in the world.4 6
Since the government is thus the largest user of encryption, critics of the
EES and Clipper scheme fear that the government will harness this
enormous purchasing power and forcibly establish the Clipper as a de
facto standard.4 7 At the moment, however, use of EES and the Clipper
chip remains optional for government agencies.
48
In fact, many agencies have not adopted the standard, choosing to
wait for an industry standard to emerge.49 Although the government
could make EES mandatory for government agencies, there are good
policy reasons for not doing so. For instance, some agencies, such as the
Federal Reserve System, are working with industry to create industry-
specific standards. 50 Moreover, not all attempts to establish a govern-
ment-wide standard have been successful. 5 1 In the current belt-
44. Rozansky, supra note 33, at 2F. It has been suggested that these phones comprised all of the
units manufactured with the Clipper Chip and that the government wanted to get them off the
market. Interview with Ken Mendelson, former Counsel to Congressman Jack Brooks (D-Tex.),
Chairman of the HouseJudiciary Committee, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 29, 1995). Mr. Mendelson
is now General Counsel at Trusted Information Systems, a computer security company that has
developed a commercial key escrow system as an alternative to Clipper.
45. In 1977, the National Bureau of Standards (now NIST), solicited proposals for the first
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) to protect unclassified government documents.
IBM submitted the winning algorithm and DES was born. BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 344-49. Prior
to that time, encryption software was limited to classified documents. See id. at 345.
46. Nina Schuyler, Bugs in the System, CAL. LAw., July 1994, at 45-46 (comments of Marc
Rotenberg, Director of Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.).
47. Id.
48. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 5998.
49. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 13 1.
50. Id. The Federal Reserve System remains committed to the banking industry's DES-based
standard. Id. (citing Interview with Marianne Emerson, Asst. Dir., Div. of Info. Resources Manage-
ment, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System (Apr. 17 &June 23, 1994)).
51. As a result of the government's attempt to establish a standard for communications
between computer networks, agencies must use two different standards: one to communicate with
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tightening mood within government, agency heads remain
understandably reluctant to make any significant commitment to-and
thus investment in-products utilizing Clipper or EES.
3. Export Controls
Currently, export of cryptographic products is restricted by the Arms
Export Control Act 52 and the Export Administration Act,53 which
collectively authorize export control of scientific and technical data and
are administered, respectively, by the Department of State 54 and the
Department of Commerce. 55 Although the two acts may overlap in their
jurisdictions, the stricter Arms Export Control Act and its regulations,
the Defense Trade Regulations,56 govern in application. Under this
regime, the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) 57 determines
whether an encryption product belongs on the highly restricted United
States Munitions List (USML). 58
According to the governing statute, the USML could apply to all
"[i]nformation [s]ecurity [s]ystems and equipment, cryptographic de-
vices, software, and components specifically designed or modified there-
fore. ' 59 In practice, however, the Director of the DTC defers to the
NSA, which in fact decides whether an encryption product is covered by
the USML.60 Although the DTC will consider applications for export
licenses on a case-by-case basis, items on the USML are rarely ex-
ported.61 The practical result of this system is that strong encryption
products 62 are barred from export.
During the Cold War, the United States coordinated its export
regulations with other members of the Coordinating Committee for
the commercial and international worlds and one to communicate with other government agencies.
Id. at 131-32.
52. Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
53. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988).
54. Exec. Order No. 11,958,42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977).
55. Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35,623 (1977).
56. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1995).
57. The Office of Defense Trade Controls resides in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at
the Department of State. 22 C.F.R. § 120.12 (1995).
58. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995).
59. Id. § 121.1, Category XlI(b).
60. See SciiNEiER, supra note 6, at 449.
61. Id.
62. Strong encryption includes DES and EES. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra
note 5, at 115 n.5.
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Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), an organization set up to
prevent sensitive technologies from falling into the hands of the Eastern
Bloc. 63 Under COCOM, any member could effectively veto the decision
of another member to re-export a sensitive technology or product.6 4
With the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, COCOM's raison ditre disap-
peared. It was formally dissolved at the end of March 1994.65 The United
States and other former members of COCOM agreed to replace it with
a new multilateral organization, the focus of which would be on restrict-
ing strategic trade with "rogue" countries and hot spots. 6 6 Thus, in
COCOM's wake, the United States continues to maintain strict export
controls on a host of technologies, including encryption.
Since other countries with software industries have less restrictive
export controls,6 y and the United States has no import controls on
encryption products, DES products are readily imported into the United
States from a number of countries, 6 8 even though they cannot be
re-exported. The Clinton Administration considered lifting restrictions
on cryptography exports, but the President "determined that vital
national security and law enforcement interests compel maintaining
appropriate control of encryption. 69 In other words, export controls are
the trump card with which the administration can continue to influence
the development and use of encryption technology.
It now seems that export controls, once an instrument of foreign
relations and military strategy, are used as instruments of domestic
regulation.7 0 In theory, export restrictions will deter a potential devel-
63. 15 C.F.R. § 768.1(a)(1) (1995).
64. Id.
65. U.S., Allies Making "Slow"Progress Toward Setting Up Post-COCOM Regime, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 533, 534 (Mar. 22, 1995).
66. Id.
67. After examining the relevant laws of many former COCOM members and some non-
COCOM countries, the Department ofJustice found that most do not restrict the importation of
encryption products. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CLIPPER CHIP REPORT IN RESPONSE TO SENATE REPORT
103-109 14 (1995) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business) [hereinafter CLIPPER CHIP
REPORT].
68. "We know that companies in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Israel, South Africa, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are freely shipping DES products to the U.S.... with no
more then (sic] a few days of government export control delay, if any." Statement of Stephen T.
Walker, President of Trusted Information Systems, Inc., Before the Subcomm. on Technology and
the Law of the Comm. on theJudiciary of the United States Senate, May 3, 1994, at 18 (on file with
Law and Policy in International Business).
69. Statement by Martha Harris, Deputy Asst. Sec. for Political-Military Affairs, Encryption-
Export Control Reform (Feb. 4, 1994).
70. Statement of Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer of Sun Microsystems, Inc., Before
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oper of a strong encryption product from developing a product that does
not utilize the EES because sales of the product would be limited to the
domestic market. 7' The export controls have a chilling effect on the U.S.
software industry: some companies are forced to develop a weak version
for export; others refuse to develop cryptographic products because of
the added expenses; and the rest face a dampened demand for their
products since potential foreign customers see no point in requesting
strong cryptography from U.S. companies unable to export it. 7 2 Strong
encryption is already widely available overseas, however, and can be
imported into this country.73
B. The Clipper Chip Scheme
The Escrowed Encryption Standard is a voluntary encryption stan-
dard that employs the secret Skipjack algorithm with a backdoor
through which law enforcement authorities have access to encrypted
74messages. When devices employing the Clipper chip communicate
with each other, they operate similarly to a public key scheme that
creates a session key. Each message contains the Law Enforcement
Access Field (LEAF), a special field that carries the chip's identification
number.7 5 The identification number corresponds to the backdoor de-
cryption key, which is split into two components and stored in escrow
and which is used to decrypt the session key.76
When law enforcement officials encounter messages encrypted with
the Clipper chip, they can retrieve the chip's identification numbers
from the LEAFs by running the message through a special device. 77 By
the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, May 3, 1994, at 3 (on file with Law and Policy in International Business). The appropriateness of
using export controls in this manner is outside the scope of this Note. See Charles L. Evans,
Comment, U.S. Export Controls of Encryption Sofiware." Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S.
Soflware Industr,'s Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469 (1994).
71. Although the DES is barred from export, the government has approved the EES for
export. New Licensing Procedures, supra note 38, at 212-13.
72. Statement of Stephen T. Walker, supra note 68, at 21.
73. A survey found 889 encryption products available across 26 countries, 431 of them using
DES. In the United States, 487 encryption products are available, 267 using DES. Encryption
Products Statistics, supra note 29. Note that the author of this survey is the Software Publishers
Association, the software industry's trade group, and that the survey does not indicate whether such
encryption products are mass-marketed or user-friendly.
74. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 5998.
75. Id. at 6003.
76. Id.
77. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE KEY ESCROW SYSTEM 2 (June
30, 1994) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
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presenting the identification numbers to the escrow agents, they can
obtain the two components of each chip's decryption key.78 After piecing
the keys together, they can decrypt the session key by running the
encrypted versions back through the special device with the key.7 9
The NIST announced EES as part of its mandate to develop and
publish Federal Information Processing Standards. ° Shortly after the
announcement, the Department of Justice selected the NIST and the
Automated Systems Division of the Department of the Treasury as
escrow agents8' 1 and published rules for the release of the decryption key
component pursuant to an authorized wiretap under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,82 state wiretap
statutes, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.8 3 The proce-
dures provide that in the event that EES encryption is encountered
during a court-approved wiretap, the agency must deliver to the escrow
agents a certificate containing the source, scope, and duration of the
wiretap authorization, and the identification number of the Clipper
chip. 84 The agency must ensure that the key component numbers are
transferred by secure means and returned upon expiration of the
authority or completion of the intercept. 85 In addition, all federal
agencies involved in the EES process-the NIST, the Department of
Justice, and the Automated Systems Division of the Department of
Treasury-have instituted certain security measures, known as the Key
Escrow Security System Policy, to govern all computer, communications,
physical, and technical security as well as administrative and procedural
security measures and personnel training.8 6
Despite this high level of procedural protection, there are no rem-
edies for unauthorized disclosures of the keys. Although the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 198687 prohibits unauthorized intercep-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 6002. For a more detailed discussion of the standard's
development see supra Part II.
81. CLIPPER CHIP REPORT, supra note 67, at 3.
82. 18U.S.C. §§ 2510eseq. (1994).
83. 50U.S.C. §§ 1801-29 (1988).
84. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY
COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO TITLE III 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1994) (on file
with Law and Policy in International Business) [hereinafter AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES].
85. Id. at 2.
86. KEY ESCROW WORKING GROUP, KEY ESCROW SECURITY POLICY 2 (Nov. 8, 1994) (draft) (on
file with Law and Policy in International Business).
87. 32 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
[Vol. 27
ELECTRONIC ENCRYPTION STANDARD
tion and disclosure of electronic communications 8 8 and provides for a
civil remedy,89 and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act of 198690 prohibits unauthorized
access to and disclosure of stored communications91 and provides for a
civil remedy,92 there are no additional protections or penalties in the
event of disclosure of the key components by escrow agents or govern-
ment officials. 93 A possible reason for this void has been presented by the
Department of Justice, which has expressed doubt that the improper
disclosure of the two key components causes any damage or that such a
disclosure would impinge upon any privacy right. 94
III. GOVERNMENT ENCRYPTION POLICY AND ITS OPPONENTS
Taken alone, Clipper may not have been so objectionable. However,
when viewed in combination with the existing strict export regime,
Clipper raises some fundamental legal, economic, and political con-
cerns.
A. Protecting Privacy
1. Privacy in Electronic Communications
At the heart of the Clipper chip debate is the issue of privacy. 9 5 As the
information age gives way to cyberspace, more and more transactions
occur electronically, sending more and more intimate and revealing
information through electronic pipelines. 96 Businesses and private citi-
88. 32 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2516-17 (1994).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1994).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-10 (1994).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-02 (1994).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (1994).
93. CLIPPER CHIP REPORT, supra note 67, at 10-11. Indeed, the Department ofJustice believes
that its strict physical and procedural security measures make such disclosure virtually impossible.
Id. at 10.
94. Id.
95. For more detailed treatment of privacy and the Clipper chip, seeJaleen Nelson, Comment,
Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and its Effect on Free Flow of Information and
Privacy, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1139 (1994); Mark I. Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters in the Surveillance
Data Stream: The Clipper Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 131 (1994); and Timothy
B. Lennon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment's Prohibitions on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 Be Like
1984?, 58 ALB. L. REv. 467 (1994).
96. One example of the case of entering cyberspace is Microsoft's inclusion of an icon in
Windows 95 that instantly connects users to its on-line service, the Microsoft Network. Kevin
Reichard, The Microsoft Network: The One-Click Connection to Win 95Applications, PC MAGAZINE, Oct. 10,
1995, at 42.
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zens alike want to protect sensitive communications from impostors and
from prying eyes. 9 7 With encryption, senders can ensure that their
documents are confidential and free from tampering, and recipients can
ensure that the documents and the sender are authentic.
Although "the right to be let alone" 98 is firmly entrenched in our
common law, the Supreme Court in 1967 first recognized a privacy
interest in electronic communication in Katz v. United States.99 Katz held
that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone
conversations and that the Fourth Amendment requires that, in order to
tap phone conversations, law enforcement officials must show probable
cause that a criminal activity is being or will be committed, limit the
scope and duration of the invasion, and be subject to judicial over-
sight.'0 0 In response to this decision, Congress enacted Title III of The
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 19 6 8 ,l1 creating
procedural safeguards and judicial oversight for wiretapping. However,
since electronic communication was not widespread in 1967, the Court
never addressed the question of whether individuals had an enforceable
expectation of privacy in their data communication. To resolve the issue,
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,02
recognizing a privacy interest in electronic data communication and
extending procedural safeguards to protect that interest.' 03
2. Privacy Concerns Generated by Clipper
Citing this privacy interest against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of electronic communications,' 0 4 privacy advocates and business
people express three concerns about the Clipper scheme: (1) that it is
the first step to government monitoring of all communications; (2) that
it unfairly presupposes that everyone using the scheme is a criminal; and
(3) that it may not offer adequate protection.
First, some fear that EES leads down a slippery slope where, at the
bottom, government would have access to all private communica-
97. For example, e-mail is as public as a postcard. Vic Sussman, Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEws &
WORLD RE.,Jan. 23, 1995, at 54, 57 (quoting cryptographer Bruce Schneier).
98. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
99. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz overruled Olmstead. Id. at 353.
100. Id. at 354-59.
101. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1994).
102. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21).
103. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
104. While the First, Third, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been held to implicate a
privacy interest, this Note is limited to a brief consideration of the Fourth Amendment.
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tions.l0 5 Since both the FBI and the NSA have a history of controversial
wiretapping,' ° 6 it is especially troublesome that the Department of
Justice refuses to discuss publicly the circumstances under which the
NSA may have access to the components outside of FISA. 10 7 Perhaps
Justice Louis Brandeis, privacy's most ardent advocate, was prescient in
1928 when he wrote:
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury
the most intimate occurrences of the home .... Can it be that
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security? °8
For its part, the government has repeatedly declared that use of the
Clipper chip is voluntary' 9 and that there are neither plans to mandate
for private use a particular type of cryptography nor to criminalize the
private use of a particular type of cryptography. " Law enforcement
agencies assert that they have no desire to achieve continuous surveil-
lance of transaction information access. but simply wish to maintain
105. "[It] comes down to one simple question: Do you have the right to keep a phone call or a
computer transmission private? The government says no."John Mintz &John Schwartz, Chipping
Away at Privacy?, WASH. POST, May 30, 1993, at HI (quoting Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data
Security).
106. The NSA and its legal regime are discussed in more detail in Part II.B. For a chronicle of
intrigue and arrogance, see generally BAmFORD, supra note 17. For an account of the FBI's
controversial history of wiretapping, see ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART Cox, THE Boss: J.
ErDGAR HOOvER AND "rE GREAT AMERICAN INQUtSITON (1988).
107. "Whether, and under what conditions, agencies of the U.S. intelligence community may
have access to escrowed key components other than in conjunction with FISA intercepts could only
be discussed in a classified document" because the sources and methods of intelligence gathering
are "sensitive to national security." CLIPPER CHIP REPORT, supra note 67, at 4. The Justice
Department maintains, however, that U.S. intelligence will act only in compliance with Executive
Order 12333 (United States Intelligence Activities, Dec. 4, 1981), and they will not target U.S.
citizens anywhere in the world. Id. at 4-5.
108. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
109. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 6001; Letter from Albert Gore, Vice President of the
United States, to Maria Cantwell, U.S. House of Representatives 1-2 (July 20, 1994) (available on
Internet from EEF (mech@eff.org)) [hereinafter Letter from Albert Gore]; Statement ofJo Ann
Harris, supra note 43, at 3.
110. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 5998.
111. "I don't want that [kind of] access-I don't need it."John Schwartz &John Mintz, Clinton
Plan For Wiretaps Taps Fears, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1994, Washington Business at 17, 22 (quoting FBI
Director LouisJ. Freeh).
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their ability to monitor voice communication.' 12 Even the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has stated that it is willing to accept additional
safeguards on wiretaps of data transmission."
3
Nevertheless, the possibility exists that the government may try to
impose the EES standard by use of its vast direct buying power and its
indirect influence through government contracts. In the event of a
failure to impose such standards, the government may try to restrict
competing technology. Indeed, the administration has made rumblings
in the past about restricting cryptography technology' 14 if law enforce-
ment becomes overwhelmed by non-Clipper technologies.
Second, privacy advocates object to the assumption implicit in EES,
namely that everyone is a potential criminal. Since the government
holds possession of the keys needed to decrypt messages even before
probable cause of criminal activity has been established, Clipper treats
everyone-innocent and guilty alike-as a criminal. 15 Moreover, since
the government can detect when EES is employed, it might be tempted
to infer nefarious activity from its very use (the idea being that only
someone with something to hide would use encryption). Thus, there
exists the danger that mere use of encryption may be raised to establish
probable cause.
In response to this objection, the government counters that, since
agents must obtain a court order to perform a wiretap operation,
Clipper does not affect substantive privacy rights.' 16 The current wire-
tap law permits the government to translate or decode intercepts as
necessary.' 17 From this point of view, the escrow arrangement and
release procedures function only to verify existing authorization and to
112. "Law enforcement is interested in voice communications 99 percent of the time."
Schuyler, supra note 46, at 48 (quoting Kent Walker, Asst. U.S. Attorney in San Francisco).
113. Schwartz & Mintz, supra note I 11, at 22.
114. FBI Director Frech raised the possibility of restricting all encryption schemes that the
government was unable to crack. FBI on the Line, Digital Media, Nov. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
115. "[I]t is like [the government is] saying that every single communication in this country
regardless of how it is conducted and regardless of where it is conducted and who conducts it may
involve a criminal plot." Privacy Expert Says Block the Clipper Chip, Newsbytes News Network,June 27,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Director of the
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.).
116. CLIPPER CHIP REPORT, supra note 67, at 10.
117. A Department ofJustice official testified that wiretap statutes permit the translation or
decoding of authorized wiretaps. Statement ofJo Ann Harris, supra note 43, at 7. The statute defines
"contents" to include "any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1994).
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prevent unauthorized release.' 18 Nevertheless, the government has
failed to address the perception of presumed guilt that Clipper intro-
duces into the mix and has left open the possibility that the fact that an
idividual employs encryption may be used to build a case for probable
cause of criminal activity.
Third, some question the wisdom of relying on a secret and untested
algorithm, in that the Clipper chip may offer a false sense of security.
Although the Clipper has received high praise from a group of five
independent evaluators,'' 9 a scientist recently discovered a flaw' 20 that
would allow sophisticated programmers to bypass the government's
backdoor access and superencrypt data.' 2' In this case, the flaw works to
the advantage of privacy users, but it illustrates the concern stemming
from reliance on a chip that remains untried and untested by private
users.
Thus, given the above issues with regard to privacy concerns gener-
ated by Clipper, it is not unlikely that there are a number of potential
users who would shy away from the technology on privacy grounds alone.
B. A Competitive Software Industry
Unlike objections prompted by privacy concerns, which are essentially
legal in nature, the software industry's objections are economic and,
thus, very political. 22 While the government may have a legitimate
interest in influencing the development of strong cryptography in the
long term, the short term side-effects of this policy may have disastrous
consequences for the U.S. software industry. A software industry group
claims that export controls could cause the U.S. software industry to lose
as much as nine billion dollars in revenues.' 23 Given that the market is
already thriving without large-scale U.S. participation,' 24 restricting
118. See generally AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 84.
119. Ernest F. Brickell et al., Skipjack Review Interim Report: The Skipjack Algorithm 1 (July
28, 1993) (reprinted in House Clipper Hearing, supra note 21, at 127).
120. A technical consideration of the Clipper chip is beyond the scope of this Note. For further
discussion of the technical capacity of the Clipper chip, see, e.g., Stephanie Stahl, Flaw Discovered in
Clipper Chip, LNFORMATIONWEEK, June 20, 1994, at 28.
121. Schuyler,supra note 46, at 48.
122. U.S. Representative Cantwell (D-Wash.), whose district includes the home of Microsoft,
sponsored a bill to loosen export restrictions. 140 CONG. REc. H5548 (daily ed. July 12, 1994)
(statement ofRep. Cantwell).
123. Bob Violino, Encryption Triggers Conniption, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 7 1994, at 15.
124. Irrespective of U.S. export controls, a booming international market for cryptography
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U.S. software companies simply undercuts their overall competitiveness.
In response, some companies are forced to develop two products: one for
the domestic market with strong encryption technology and one for the
market abroad with a weaker technology.' 25 Other companies simply do
not export their products. 1
26
In essence, the government is competing head-to-head with domestic
cryptography developers. With the introduction of EES and its classified
algorithm, the government has become the software industry's most
fierce competitor. 127 The government's goal, according to some, is
nothing less than preventing the widespread adoption of an interna-
tional, compatible, easy-to-use, strong public key system.' 
28
EES has failed to add value to the market for encryption products.
Since the EES algorithm is classified, the standard has had little effect
on the pace of cryptographic innovation. In the long term, the lack of
variety in encryption products may slow the overall pace of improve-
ments in the technology.' 29 Furthermore, Clipper did not start out
strongly 30 and has failed to achieve wide acceptance. 13  There are
several explanations for this failure. First, other technologies, such as a
combination of DES and RSA, 132 are emerging as competing stan-
dards.1 33 Second, potential users are concerned about privacy and the
does exist. The Software Publishers' Association found 889 products-431 of them with DES-
across 26 foreign countries. Encryption Products Statistics, supra note 29.
125. For example, Lotus Development Corp., the fourth largest U.S. software company,
needed to develop a weaker version of its Notes e-mail package for export.James Coates, A Diverse
Group of Critics Hopes to Clip U.S. Code Plan, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1994, Sec. 4, at 1, 2. By contrast,
Netscape decided to market a 40-bit encryption scheme worldwide rather than design a stronger
version for the United States. Graeme Browning, Code Words, NATIONALJ., Oct. 21, 1995, at 2589-90.
126. Of 487 encryption products identified by the Software Publishers' Association, 267 employ
DES and, therefore, they cannot be exported. Encryption Products Statistics, supra note 29.
127. "For almost 10 years, I've been going toe to toe with [the NSA]. The success of [my]
company is the worst thing that can happen to them. To them, we're the real enemy, we're the real
target." Levy, supra note 13, at 50 (quoting D.James Bidzos, Director of RSA Data Security).
128. Id.
129. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 130.
130. Of the 298 individual comments submitted following announcement of the EES proposal,
nearly all opposed adoption of the standard. Approval of EES, 59 Fed. Reg. at 5998.
131. IBM and the International Chamber of Commerce have come out against the Clipper
Chip. Rozansky, supra note 33, at 2F.
132. The Internet Task Force is developing an encryption standard that combines DES with
RSA public key technology. Mitch Wagner, E-Mail Encryption Standard Readied, ELECTRONIC ENGINEER-
ING TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Elengt File.
133. As stated in one source in March 1995, "RSA's encryption is fast moving to becoming a
standard-or at least the basis for one." Daniel S. Levine, On-Line Commercial Traffic Seeks Route to
'Net Gains, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Mar. 17,1995, at A7, available in WESTLAW, Bus-date File.
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security of key escrow and of a classified algorithm. 34 Finally, technologi-
cal uncertainty may cause firms to wait and see which standard emerges
as the market leader.' 35 With EES, the government has failed both to
spur innovation of encryption technology and to offer an acceptable
alternative to existing products.
C. Public Safety/National Security Interest
The Supreme Court has held that the executive branch has a constitu-
tional duty to "apprehend and obtain conviction of those who have
violated criminal statutes of the United States"' 36 and "to protect our
Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlaw-
ful means."' 137 To this end, the government asserts that wiretapping is
an invaluable tool in solving and preventing crimes. 38 While acknowledg-
ing the need to protect the privacy of information, law enforcement
officials' 39 are concerned that a significant criminal element may be able
to use encryption to cover its activities. 40 Computer crime is wide-
ranging and includes white collar embezzlement, financial theft, pil-
fered services, drug smuggling, 14 1 terrorism, and child pornography.
142
Moreover, should digital cash become a reality without safeguards to
track financial transactions, money launderers, terrorists, and organized
crime will be able to move cash freely and talented counterfeiters could
have a field day.'
43
134. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 130 n.38.
135. Id. at 130.
136. United States v. Valenzuela-Berual, 458 U.S. 858, 863 (1982).
137. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).
138. According to the Department of Justice, over the past decade, more than 22,000
convictions have resulted from court-approved surveillance. Statement ofJo Ann Harris, supra note
43, at 1.
139. These include officials at the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, the Justice Department's Criminal Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
banking regulators including the Federal Reserve. Benjamin Wittes, The Dark Side of Digital Cash,
LEGAL TIMES,Jan. 30, 1995, at 1, 24.
140. Although no hard numbers exist for the amount of computer crime, experts at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center would begin estimates in the billions of dollars.
Sussman, supra note 97, at 55.
141. The challenge posed by strong encryption is especially prevalent in drug cases where
wealthy drug dealers can afford to purchase sophisticated cryptography. In 1993, 75% of court-
authorized wiretaps and bugs were approved for narcotics investigations.Jonathan Erickson, Who's
That Tapping at Your Back Door?, DR. DoBB'sJ., Nov. 1994, at 6.
142. Sussman,supra note 97, at 56.
143. Wittes, supra note 139, at 1, 24. Stanley Morris, Director of the Treasury Department's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, asserts that safeguards are "very, very high priority." Id.
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Scott Charney, chief of the Justice Department's computer crimes
unit, summed up law enforcement's dilemma:
People do want the ability to engage in transactions with the
understanding that these transactions aren't subject to surveil-
lance .... This may be good for 99 percent of people, because 99
percent of people are law abiding and need privacy protections.
But what about the others?'
Additionally, the FBI has warned that new encryption technology is
making it more difficult to tap phones 145 and that easy access to strong
encryption by the criminal element would pose "an extremely serious
threat to the public safety and national security."' 146 Law enforcement
agencies thus distinguish between the availability of encryption for the
sophisticated programmer and encryption for the novice; their primary
concern is that standardized and easy-to-use encryption may become
widely available. 147 The administration's encryption policy is effective in
addressing this concern to the extent that it discourages the develop-
ment of strong, user-friendly, affordable, and accessible encryption.
The NSA also has a very real interest in keeping the lid on what could
quickly become Pandora's box. 148 The National Security Agency has two
missions: (1) to gather signal intelligence and (2) to develop encryption
technology to protect U.S. government classified information.' 49 Strong
encryption that is readily available and easy to use may make the NSA's
first mission more difficult.
At first glance, the NSA's experience and expertise 150 should make it
uniquely qualified to develop strong encryption technology that meets
the twin goals of protecting the privacy of users and allowing law
enforcement to monitor criminal communications. There is fear, how-
ever, that the concerns and agenda of the NSA are driving the entire
144. Id.
145. Erickson, supra note 141, at 6.
146. House Clipper Hearing, supra note 21, at 13 (statement ofJames Kallstrom).
147. Stewart A. Baker, Don't Worry, Be Happy: Wy Clipper Is Good for You, WIRED,June 1994, at
130, 132.
148. Statement of Vice Admiral J. M. McConnell, Director, NSA, Before the Subcomm. on
Technology and the Law of the Comm. on thejudiciary of the United States Senate, May 3, 1994, at
5 (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
149. Baker, supra note 147, at 133. However, the NSA's charter document, a seven-page
memorandum signed by President Truman, remains classified. BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 1.
150. The NSA has more expertise in cryptography than any other organization in the United
States. Baker, supra note 147, at 133.
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U.S. encryption policy.' 5' Currently, the agency plays a large role in
export controls by determining whether an encryption product should
be on the USML. In addition, pursuant to an agreement with the NIST,
the NSA plays a significant role in setting federal processing stan-
dards. 5 2 Both prongs of'the administration's current policy cater to the
NSA's concerns. First, strict export controls help prevent encryption of
foreign communications that would jeopardize the NSA's ability to
monitor signal intelligence.' 53 Second, Clipper might lead to an interna-
tional encryption standard 154 to which NSA would have the backdoor
keys.
IV. CLIPPER CHIP AND EXPORT CONTROLS CANNOT ACHIEVE
GOVERNMENT'S GOALS
The administration needs to realize that its twin policies of Clipper
Chip promotion and strict export controls are flawed and are doomed to
fail because of strongly held legal and economic objections.
First, the Clipper scheme poses serious privacy and technical con-
cerns. The Clipper may be the first step on a slippery slope to greater
government intrusion. Given the history of surveillance by the FBI and
NSA, the agencies' roles in developing EES and Clipper raise suspicions
about the chip's reliability and the access to the backdoor decryption
key. In addition, employment of Clipper may be used to infer probable
cause. Moreover, there are doubts about a product that has not been
subjected to trial by the market.
Second, the policy of strict export controls undercuts the ability of
U.S. software developers to compete. Export controls prevent U.S.
software developers from including strong encryption in their products
and put them at a competitive disadvantage with their international
rivals. Moreover, the restrictions prevent encryption developers from
participating in a lucrative market.
Third, as a result of these concerns and the lack of a clear standard,
Clipper has not been embraced by private users. People will not entrust
the intimate details of their lives or confidential financial information to
an algorithm that is classified. Not only is performance an issue,' 55 but
users of encryption, especially foreign users, will question whether
151. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44.
152. See supra Part II.B. I (discussing standard setting).
153. Levy, supra note 13, at 49-50.
154. Id. at 49, 51.
155. Notwithstanding the fiodings of the five evaluators. See supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
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privacy is really protected by encryption technology that was developed
by the super-secret NSA.1
56
V. IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION
There are four possible outcomes to the current situation. First, the
government may try to impose a standard by executive fiat. Second, the
government may stick to its policy and software developers will continue
to operate under the current encryption regime. Third, there may be a
legislative solution. Fourth, all sides may reach an informal accommoda-
tion. For the most part, both the opponents and the supporters of the
Clipper scheme are warily eyeing each other to see who is going to make
the first move, though one public interest group opposed to the strict
export controls has filed suit against the government seeking their
removal. 1
5 7
A. Resolution Through Executive Action
In general, the Clinton administration has taken a conciliatory ap-
proach. In a letter to U.S. Representative Cantwell, Vice President Gore
indicated that the administration was willing to sit down with the
software industry to reach a mutually acceptable solution for data
encryption.' 58 To that end, the Interagency Working Group on Encryp-
tion and Telecommunications Policy'5 9 (WG) was created to consider
the economic significance of a change in the federal encryption standard
and to adjust the administration's approach appropriately.' 6 The IWG
has been working with industry, the private sector, privacy advocates,
and members of Congress to come up with alternatives to the Clipper
scheme; those alternatives include new technologies, alternative escrow
156. "If you're a foreigner, assuming you have no bad intentions, are you going to feel secure
knowing that the U.S. government can read your mail anytime they want?" Security, Privacy and
Reliability Issues Important to GII, Daily Executive Rep. (BNA), Feb. 14, 1995, S-7, S-9 (quoting Jim
Burger, Director of Government Affairs for Apple Computer).
157. The Electronic Frontier Fund (EFF) has filed a suit against the federal government
seeking to lift export controls on encryption software. DavidJohnson, Chairman, EFF, Address at
the 8th Ann. Advanced Computer L. Inst. (Mar. 23, 1995).
158. Letter from Albert Gore, supra note 109, at 2.
159. The IWG consists of representatives from the National Security Council, White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Economic Councils, Departments of Commerce,
Justice, State and the Treasury, NIST, Office of Management and the Budget, FBI, NSA, Central
Intelligence Agency, U.S. Customs Service, Federal Communications Commission, and the Office
of the Vice President. CLIPPER CHIP REPORT, supra note 67, at 16.
160. House Clipper Hearing, supra note 21, at 48 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy
Director, NIST).
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agents, and a government standard for data encryption.' 6' Currently,
the IWG is circulating a working paper that purportedly recommends
alternatives to EES such as commercial escrow and the use of published
algorithms. 162
Nevertheless, although the administration has said it will not seek
legislation restricting the use of cryptographic products in the United
States, 6 3 the FBI Director has already raised the specter of such a
possibility. 164 Moreover, in the wake of the bdmbing of the federal
building in Oklahoma in early 1995, the administration may take a
harder line with wiretaps and encryption. Most recently, it proposed
legislation to allow emergency wiretaps of suspected terrorists; this
proposal, however, was rejected by the Senate. 165
B. Status Quo
The government cannot maintain its current monopoly in crypto-
graphic technology. In fact, a good argument can be made that many
significant advances in cryptography occurred outside of government,
including DES and public key.' 6 6 As the need for cryptography steadily
grows, 167 so does the number of cryptography producers.' 68 The cryptog-
raphy genie is out of the bottle, and it is doubtful that government can
put him back in.
1. Public Key Without Escrow
Public key standards 69 have proliferated across cyberspace, thanks to
the success of RSA Data Security and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). RSA
161. CLIPPER CHIP REPORT, supra note 67, at 16.
162. Interview with Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown University Department of Computer
Science, Member of Evaluation Committee for EES, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 24, 1995).
163. House Clipper Hearing, supra note 21, at 47 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy
Director, NIST). "You can use whatever encryption you want to in the United States." Security,
Privacy andReliability, supra note 156, at S-9 (quoting Mike Nelson, Spec. Asst., White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy).
164. FBIon the Line, supra note 114.
165. Helen Dewar & Kenneth J. Cooper, Senate Rejects Clinton Proposal to Allow Terrorist Case
Wiretaps, WASH. POST, May 27, 1995, at A 1l.
166. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44.
167. New technologies expose new vulnerabilities to fraud, hackers, corporate espionage,
eavesdropping, and foreign industrial espionage. Karen L. Casser, Address at the 8th Ann.
Advanced Computer L. Inst. (Mar. 23, 1995).
168. According to the Encryption Products Database Standard, 889 software and encryption
products are available worldwide. Encryption Products Statistics, supra note 29.
169. See supra Part II.A. (discussing public key cryptography).
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holds the patents for the original public key algorithms, while PGP
incorporates some of these algorithms in its code. 1 7' By virtue of their
power, RSA-based public key algorithms are currently emerging as the
standard.' 71
In April 1995, three of the largest on-line information companies and
two major Internet software providers agreed to a security standard for
transactions on the Internet.' 72 The agreement consolidates two cur-
rently incompatible standards and will allow Internet users to communi-
cate with one another using the same encryption scheme.' 73 PGP,
developed by amateur cryptographer Zimmerman and completed by
mid-1991, was placed on the Internet by one of his friends and is now
available for use by anyone with a modem and a computer.' 
74
Notwithstanding their popularity and appeal, RSA-based algorithms
face a major hurdle in the form of continued opposition on the part of
the federal government.' 75 Since they would qualify as strong encryption
technology, these algorithms are barred by the USML from export and
only the weaker, 40-bit versions are exportable.' 76 It seems all but
certain that in order to obtain an export license, public key algorithms
will have to provide for some type of backdoor access.
2. International Clipper
Hewlett-Packard is working on a hardware encryption scheme that
would give encryption users a choice of technologies while allowing a
national government to access encrypted messages within its borders.' 7 7
According to the plan, each country would issue an electronic card to
170. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 124-25; SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at
436. It is alleged that Zimmerman used proprietary RSA algorithms without permission. Levy, supra
note 13, at 60.
171. Levine, supra note 133, at A7. Despite an open invitation, prestige, and a cash prize, no
one has yet broken RSA's code. Id.
172. Peter H. Lewis, Accord is Reached on a Common Security System for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1995, at D5. The companies are American Online, Compuserve, IBM, Netscape Technologies,
and Enterprise Integration Technologies. Id.
173. Id.
174. John Schwartz, Privacy Program: An On-Line Weapon?, WASH. POST,Apr. 3,1995, at Al,A13.
Zimmerman may be indicted for violation of U.S. export laws. Id.
175. Some experts believe the government will pressure RSA to create a backdoor for law
enforcement. Levine, supra note 133, at A7.
176. A 410-bit key encryption program developed by RSA for Netscape was recenly cracked in
eight days. Browning, supra note 125, at 2590.
177. Jill Gambon, The Business of Security, INFORMATION WEEK, Apr. 10, 1995, at 64, 65.
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anyone wishing to encrypt his or her communications. 178 The card would
contain all of the cryptographic standards approved for use within that
country and would give the user the choice of which standard to
employ.179 When the user transmitted a message, the card would stamp
the message, much like a postage stamp. 8 0 By examining the stamped
message, the government could determine how the message was en-
crypted and then proceed to decrypt it.' 8 '
Although Hewlett-Packard's scheme offers more options than the
Clipper scheme and is designed to work internationally, it has one major
drawback: the government would be intimately involved. Arguably, this
scenario is more intrusive than Clipper because a government would
have unfettered access to all encrypted communications and would have
the power to select the range of encryption technologies available.
3. Commercial Key Escrow
There are several companies working on commercial key escrow
systems, including Banker's Trust, Trusted Information Systems, and
AT&T.' 82 A commercial key escrow system functions much like Clipper,
with two notable exceptions: (1) the system is not limited to any one
encryption algorithm and (2) the government does not retain possession
of the decryption keys. However, the government would have access to
the decryption key after presenting a court authorization to install a
wiretap. '"
In the Trusted Information Systems (TIS) scheme, for example,
84
companies or individuals would deposit the decryption key for their
encryption products with a bonded or licensed commercial agent, where
it would be held in trust under rigid safeguards. 8 5 Each encrypted
communication would carry a field containing the identification of the
escrow agent and a copy of the decryption key, the latter also en-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Elizabeth Corcoran, Three Ways to Catch a Code, WASH. POST, Mar, 16, 1995, at B I1, B 12.
181. Id.
182. Trusted Information Systems and AT&T have software proposals while Bankers Trust
has proposed an international system with encryption hardware. Dorothy E. Denning, The Case for
"Clipper," TEcH. REv.,July 1995, at 48, 54-55.
183. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44.
184. Although all commercial key escrow systems have commercial escrow, allow for govern-
ment access, and are not limited to a particular algorithm, they vary enough to be confusing. In the
interest of clarity, this Note will examine how one particular system, TIS, operates.
185. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44.
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crypted. 86 The whole arrangement resembles a locked box with an
address on the outside and a key on the inside. 8 7 By retrieving the
escrow agent's identification and presenting the proper identification or
authority, the individual or company could obtain the decryption key.'
88
Since the individual or business users of the commercial escrow system
would have entered into a contract with the commercial key agent, the
agent would be bound by contract law' 89 and thus liable for unautho-
rized disclosure and use of the key.190
Commercial key escrow addresses many of the concerns in the current
debate. The government would not have possession of the decryption
keys, and access would be administered by a neutral third party. The
system is not limited to one algorithm, encouraging software companies
to develop new algorithms and allowing users to choose whichever
method best suits them. For its part, government would have access to
keys uncovered during a valid wiretap. Nevertheless, users of commer-
cial key would be ceding to the government the right to decrypt their
communications if the government finds probable cause. For some
privacy advocates, even this line is one that should not be crossed.' 9'
C. Resolution through Legislative Action
It would be an understatement to say that the EES announcement
was quietly received in the halls of Congress. Although there have been
some hearings, few bills on the subject have been introduced since the
announcement, as the Democratic Congress appeared reluctant to
make any substantive changes to the government's encryption policy. As
noted above, 19 2 the Republican Congress rejected an administrative
proposal to expand the authority of law enforcement agencies to make
wiretaps. It seems that the current Congress will continue to let the
186. Corcoran, supra note 180, at B12.
187. Id.
188. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44.
189. See Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in
Cyberspace through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35JURIMETRICSJ. 1, 12 (1994) (suggesting contract law is
more appropriate than criminal law for controlling low level illegal acts).
190. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44. Although most of the elements could be
implemented under existing law, the system could benefit from legislation to lock in legal rights,
obligations, and remedies. Interview with Beryl Howell, Senior Counsel to Senator Patrick Leahy,
SenateJudiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 23, 1995).
191. The Electronic Frontier Fund and Electronic Privacy Information Center are both in this
camp.
192. See supra Part V.A.
[Vol. 27
ELECTRONIC ENCRYPTION STANDARD
White House make initiatives and be content to defeat the proposals or
to enact implementing legislation.' 93
In May 1995, both the House and the Senate convened hearings to
question representatives of the NSA, NIST, and the Department of
Justice on the details of Clipper as well as to solicit expert opinion from
private industry.' 94 In July 1994, Representative Maria Cantwell (D-
Wash.), whose congressional district includes Redmond, the home of
Microsoft, proposed an amendment to the Export Administration Act
that would have eased the export controls on encryption software.195 In
exchange for dropping the proposed amendment, Vice President Gore
promised that the administration would work with industry to come up
with an alternative to Clipper for high speed data transmission and
pointed out that the administration supported a five-month policy
review and two studies on export controls.' 96 Upon closer examination,
however, the Vice President's letter did not offer anything new but
simply restated the administration's current encryption policy. 197 Also
in July, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) attached language to the Senate
Report for the Justice Department's annual budget instructing the
Attorney General to answer ten detailed questions on the Clipper
scheme.'
98
Perhaps the most comprehensive legislative proposal, the Encryption
Standards and Procedures Act of 1994,' 99 was offered by Representative
193. Beryl Howell believes that legislation will eventually be necessary to implement commer-
cial key escrow or a mandatory government standard, particularly to address the issue of how law
enforcement and intelligence agencies obtain access to escrowed keys. Interview with Beryl Howell,
supra note 190. In contrast, Stewart A. Baker believes that legislation is by no means inevitable and
probably unnecessary. Interview with Stewart A. Baker, former General Counsel to the NSA, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 23, 1995).
194. Hearing on the Administration's "Clipper" Chip Key Escrow Program Before the Subcomm. on
Technology and the Law of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Hearing on
Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Environment &Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
195. H.R. 3937, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REc. H5548 (1994).
196. Letter from Albert Gore, supra note 109. When Senator Leahy asked about the adminis-
tration's policy review at the subcommittee hearing, he was told there had only been a few
meetings. Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy on Vice President Gore's Clipper Chip LetterJuly 21,
1994 (on file with Law and Policy in International Business) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Leahy].
197. Statement of Sen. Leahy, supra note 196. The letter stated that Clipper remained the
voluntary federal standard for voice communication, that the administration would work with
industry to develop a key escrow system for data communicaiton, and that there would be no
restrictions on encryption products currently exportable. Letter from Albert Gore, supra note 109.
198. S. REP. No. 309, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 22-23 (1994).
199. H.R. 5199, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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George Brown, Jr. (D-Cal.).2 00 Finding that the value of encryption
technology to the security and protection of private communications
conflicts with the importance of wiretapping to provide for the public
safety and national security, the bill would have required the NIST to
hold an open rule-making process so that all interested parties could
influence the final standard. 20 ' The bill, which was referred to the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, was never reported out
of committee.
D. Informal Accommodation
All sides-law enforcement, privacy advocates, the computer indus-
try, and individual and business users-have compelling interests in the
current debate triggered by Clipper. At the moment, the debate is at an
impasse, but the proliferation of encryption products and the increasing
demand for strong, exportable cryptography are driving all parties
toward compromise. For that reason, discussions between government
and privacy advocates, the computer industry, and business are taking
place behind the scenes, and a few proposals are in circulation, 2
One proposed accommodation would entail an encryption scheme
including some access for law enforcement agencies, procedural safe-
guards-preferably administered by a neutral third party and supple-
mented by legal remedies-and an unclassified algorithm suitable for
export. In this way, government would obtain access to encrypted
communications when authorized, privacy advocates could rely on mean-
ingful safeguards and remedies, and the computer software and hard-
ware industries would be free to compete abroad. The only drawback to
this scheme may be that the current unclassified algorithms are not as
complex as the EES, and therefore the cryptographic protections they
provide are not as extensive. 20 3 However, new and more complex
algorithms will arise as the need for them becomes more acute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Succinctly stated, Clipper is a commercial failure, although the
current policy continues to postpone the day when strong encryption
200. Then Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
201. 140 CONG. REc. E2118 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Rep. Brown).
202. Interview with Dorothy Denning, supra note 162.
203. Dorothy E. Denning, Crime and Crypto on the Information Superhighway (forthcoming
inj. CRIM.JUST. EDUC.).
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prevails both in the United States and abroad. Gradually, the private
market is eroding the NSA's monopoly on cryptography technology.
However, the government still wields enormous clout as the largest user
of encryption technology, through administration of export controls,
and by issuing federal standards.
Having given the private sector notice that it will aggressively pursue
its interests, the federal government should sit down with business, the
software and hardware industries, and privacy advocates and attempt to
reach a compromise. This compromise scheme must be viable, volun-
tary, and marketable here and abroad.2 °4 It will probably include some
form of commercial escrow, proprietary algorithm, and public key. The
administration has already indicated its preference for a compromise
involving commercial key escrow,20 5 and there are in circulation several
proposals involving commercial key escrow.
20 6
A public key system that includes a strong yet exportable algorithm
and a commercial escrow component is such a compromise. The govern-
ment would continue to review encryption products as it does cur-
rently20 7 but would make exceptions for certain algorithms with key
escrow provisions. At a minimum, DES should be licensed for export in
return for government access to commercially escrowed keys.20 8 Since
DES is already widely available abroad, the government would only be
acknowledging the existing state of the encryption technology market.
It would still be able to prevent the most powerful cryptographic
products from becoming freely available overseas.
The proposed cryptography system is a pragmatic solution that
addresses most concerns without favoring one side over the other. By
privatizing the function of key escrow, relying on contract liability
concepts, and enacting strict penalties for disclosure, the compromise
addresses the legal concerns of privacy advocates while allowing law
enforcement officials to access encrypted messages when authorized to
do so. By avoiding limitation to a particular algorithm and loosening
export restrictions for algorithms with escrow, the compromise would
give software developers the opportunity to offer sophisticated encryp-
tion products here and abroad while safeguarding national security.
204. An area that merits further examination is how the United States policy on cryptography
will interact with foreign users, other governments, and their legal regimes.
205. Letter from Albert Gore, supra note 109.
206. Interview with Dorothy Denning, supra note 162.
207. Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44.
208. Denning, Mendelson, and Howell each stressed that this would be a minimum require-
ment for establishment of a workable commercial escrow. Interview with Dorothy Denning, supra
note 162; Interview with Ken Mendelson, supra note 44; Interview with Beryl Howell, supra note 190.
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Finally, by excepting certain pre-approved escrow algorithms with com-
mercial escrow from the rigid export regime, the compromise would
encourage the development of secure encryption products while en-
abling the NSA to keep abreast of cryptography expertise.
EPILOGUE
On August 17, 1995, the NIST announced a proposal to allow export
of strong encryption software products that employ up to 64-bit keys as
long as the products include a third-party escrow scheme. 2 9 The agency
invited industry representatives to discuss escrow issues in workshops
scheduled for September 6 and 7.21°
On September 21, 1995, in a speech to the International Cryptogra-
phy Institute, FBI Director Louis French asserted that encryption is a
"public safety issue" and cited several cases ranging from a plan to
assassinate the Pope to child pornography on the Internet where encryp-
tion has hampered the efforts of law enforcement authorities. He
declared that unless Congress decides to revamp Fourth Amendment
law, his agency will continue to hold out for court-authorized access to
encrypted records and communications.
21 1
On November 7, 1995, a computer industry coalition of 37 companies
broke off negotiations with the government, indicating that the adminis-
tration was too inflexible to reach a compromise. This group, which
includes America Online, Apple Computer, AT&T, Eastman Kodak,
Microsoft, and Novell, pledged to present its own proposal to the White
House and to Congress in the next six months. 2
209. Commerce's NISTAnnounces Process for Dialogue on Key Escrow Issues, NIST Release No. 95-24,
Aug. 17, 1995.
210. Memorandum for Registrants for the Sept. 6-7, 1995 Key Escrow Issues Meeting, NIST,
Aug. 25, 1995.
211. Louis J. Freeh, Speech Before the International Cryptography Institute, Washington,
D.C., Sept. 21, 1995.
212. John Markoff, Industry Group Rebuffs U.S. on Encryption, N.Y. TIME.S, Nov. 8,1995, at D5.
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